Maintainability of Writ Petiton under Article 226

Writ Petition will not be maintainable if alternative remedy not availed

 

Article 226 of the Constitution of India refers to power of High Court's to issue certain writs throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

Article 226 of the Constitution sub clause 1 and 2 are as below:

1.   Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part – III and for any other purpose.

2.                  The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or any person also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relating to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of the such power, notwithstanding that the seat of the such government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.

Subject of discussion is confined to bar to writ petitions in context of availability of alternate remedies. Before we proceed further with the discussion, it is necessary to elaborate the concept of bar to writ petitions.

Article 226 of the Constitution of India reserves original jurisdiction to the High Court to issue writs. The first thought which is to be pondered is as to whether the writ petition can be barred or whether there are any circumstances in which jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a writ petition is barred. The bar of entertaining the cases as you all well know can be expressly provided or can be read by necessary implication. Can there be any circumstances in which the writ jurisdiction can be barred by any Parliamentary legislation or by any State Act is the moot question. This aspect of the matter is now well settled and it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be barred by any Act of Parliament or even by any constitutional amendment.

The right of judicial review granted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a basic feature of the Constitution and cannot be amended by even a constitutional amendment. When by any constitutional amendment, remedy of writ before a High Court cannot be barred, same cannot be done by any Parliamentary legislation or by State enactment. There is one Supreme Court judgement in this context which is relevant to be referred to that is the judgement of Apex Court in 1997 (3) SCC 261., L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and Others.

The above judgement of L. Chandra Kumar (supra) has been delivered by the Constitution Bench of seven Judges. The matter arose in context of creation of Tribunal in exercise of power under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India, by 42nd  Amendment part XIV (a) has been added in the Constitution which provides for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunal created by Parliament. Article 323-A (2) (d) provides that law made by the Parliament may exclude the jurisdiction of “all courts” except the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

In L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the Apex Court considered the validity of the above Article by which the jurisdiction of the High Court was excluded. The Apex Court after considering the earlier judgements of the Apex Court including the celebrity judgement of Kesavananda Bharati Vs. State of Kerala, 1973 (4) SCC 225 held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be barred and any law barring the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India offends the basic structure of the Constitution and hence not permissible.

Following was laid down in paragraphs

90.       “We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter.”

91.       “It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a first appellate court. We have already emphasized the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of the Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jain case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the  possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the aforestated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls.” 

The Apex Court, however in the said judgement further laid down that against the judgement of a Tribunal writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is entertainable before a Division Bench of the High Court. The Apex Court further laid down that Tribunal created under Article 323-A and 323-B however shall entertain the matters falling in their jurisdiction and it will not be open for the litigants to directly approach the High Court and the remedy is to be first availed in the Tribunal.

Following was laid down in paragraph

99.       “In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”

Thus, from the above, it is clear that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be barred by any constitutional amendment or by any Parliamentary or State Act, but while interpreting the power under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India the High Court and the Supreme Court have laid down a self-imposed rule of restriction i.e. jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India shall not be exercised if alternate remedy is available to a litigants. Now, it is well settled by catena of decisions that whenever there is alternate remedy available to a litigant, jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India which is a discretionary jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the High Court. The alternate remedy may be by way of normal forum of hierarchy of Courts or forum provided in a statutory provision or may otherwise exists. Various facets of this aspect has been examined time and again by the Apex Court which can be illustrated by giving reference to some decided cases of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Various propositions have been laid by the Apex Court in this context.

AIR, 1958 SC 86, State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Nooh.

Facts:

The matter arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the judgement of the High Court passed in a writ petition quashing the departmental proceedings against a police constable. A police constable was departmentally proceeded and a dismissal order was passed. The most important feature of the case was that the Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the enquiry recorded his own statement in the proceeding. The High Court held that there was a violation of principle of natural justice since the Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the proceedings himself appeared as witness in the inquiry which makes a case of strong bias resulting in violation of principle of natural justice. Before the Supreme Court an argument was raised that there being an alternate remedy, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition. In this context, the Apex Court laid down the principle which provides for exception to the rule of non-entertainability of writ petition when there is an alternate remedy.

Paragraphs 10 and 11 are relevant which are to the following effects:

10.              “In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will be only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, P. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior Court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. In the King v. Postmaster-General; Ex parte Carmichael, 1928-1 KB 291 (E), a certiorari was issued although the aggrieved party had an alternative remedy by way of appeal. It has been held that the superior court will readily issue a certiorari in a case where there has been a denial of natural justice before a Court of summary jurisdiction. The case of Rex v. Wands-worth Justices; Ex parte Read, 1942-1 KB 281 (F) is an authority in point. In that case a man had been convicted in a court of summary jurisdiction without giving him an opportunity of being heard. It was held that his remedy was not by a case stated or by an appeal before the quarter sessions but by application to the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction. At p. 284 Viscount Caldecote, C.J., observed:

“It remains to consider the argument that the remedy of certiorari is not open to the applicant because others were available. It would be ludicrous in such a case as the present for the convicted person to ask for a case to be stated. It would mean asking this Court to consider as a question of law whether justices were right in convicting a man without hearing his evidence. That is so extravagant an argument as not to merit a moment’s consideration. As to the right of appeal to quarter sessions, it may be that the applicant could have had his remedy if he had pursued that course, but I am not aware of any reason why, if in such circumstances as these, he preferred to apply for an order of certiorari to quash his conviction, the Court should be debarred from granting his application.”

Likewise in Khurshed Modi v. Rent Controller, Bombay; AIR 1947 Bom 46 (G), it was held that the High Court would not refuse to issue a writ of certiorari merely because there was a right of appeal. It was recognized that ordinarily the High Court would require the petitioner to have recourse to his ordinary remedies, but if it found that there had been a breach of fundamental principles of justice, the High Court would certainly not hesitate to issue the writ of certiorari. To the same effect are the following observations of Harries, C.J., in 56 Cal WN 453: (AIR 1952 Cal 656) (D) at p. 470 (of Cal WN): (at p. 665 of AIR):

“There can, I think, be no doubt that Court can refuse to issue a certiorari if the petitioner has other remedies equally convenient and effective. But it appears to me that there can be cases where the Court can and should issue a certiorari even where such alternative remedies are available. Where a Court or tribunal, which is called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions discards all rules of natural justice and arrives at a decision contrary to all accepted principles of justice then it appears to me that the Court can and must interfere.”

It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari. (See Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 14, Art. 40, p. 189). If, therefore, the existence of other adequate legal remedies is not per se a bar to the issue of certiorari and if in a proper case it may be the duty of the superior court to issue a writ of certiorari to correct the errors of an inferior Court or tribunal called upon to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions and not to relegate the petitioner to other legal remedies available to him and if the superior Court can in a proper case exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a petitioner who has allowed the time to appeal to expire or has not perfected his appeal e.g., by furnishing security required by the statute, should it then be laid down as an inflexible rule of law that the superior Court must deny the writ when an inferior Court or tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrived at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior Court or tribunal on appeal or revision? The case of 1889-22 QBD 345 (C) referred to in 1951 SCR 344: (AIR 1951 SC 217) (B) furnishes the answer. There the manager of a club was convicted under a certain statute for selling beer by retail without an excise retail license. Subsequently he was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, namely, beer without a license under another statute. Upon hearing of the later charge the Magistrate treated it as a second offence and imposed a full penalty authorized in the case of a second offence by the latter statute. His appeal to the quarter sessions having been dismissed, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus and it was granted by the King’s Bench Division on the ground that the Magistrate could not treat the later offence as a second offence, because it was not a second offence under the Act under which he was convicted for the second time. Evidently the point was taken that if there had been any error, irregularity or illegality committed by the Magistrate, the quarter sessions could have on appeal corrected the same and that the quarter sessions having dismissed the appeal the Court of Queen’s Bench Division could not issue the writ of habeas corpus. This was repelled by the following observation of Hawkins, J.:

“This is true as a fact, but it puts the prosecution in no better position, for if the Magistrate had no power to give himself jurisdiction by finding that there had been a first offence where there had been none, the justices could not give it to him.”

11.       On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases – and the instant case is in point – where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior Court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior court’s sense of fair play the superior Court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the Court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior Court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior Court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that.”

Labour and Industrial Disputes

Large number of cases come to the High Court in the writ petition challenging the violation of provisions of Industrial Disputes, Act, 1947 and other statutory enactment. The Apex Court laid down the principle that whenever a writ petition is filed for enforcement of right flowing from any statutory enactment, forum of which is provided to be a specific forum, the High Court should decline to entertain the writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Some important cases of the Apex Court are:

(2004) 4 SCC 268., U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd And Others. Vs. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh.

Facts:

The Corporation had undertaken a work at Betwa Bridge Jhansi. Certain workmen did not report for duty. A notice was published by the Corporation that those workmen who continuously absents for more than 10 days of their service be terminated according to certified Standing Orders of the Corporation. Services of one workman was terminated. He filed writ petition in this High Court. The writ petition was dismissed that the workman could raise an industrial dispute if he so desired.

Another writ petition was filed by the Union of the workman which was allowed by the High Court against which order the Corporation went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the said judgement again reiterated and laid down principle. It is relevant to refer to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgement.

11.       “We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of the respondent Union at all. The dispute was an industrial dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as U.P. IDA, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the respondent Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act. In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496] it was held that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under the Act. This was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide

“a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedurers followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they  are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them.”[Ed.: So held in Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 at p. 91 to 92b in para 28 after quoting the principles enunciated in Premier Automobiles; as explained in (2002) 2 SCC 542 at 547]

12.       Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court’s powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner.”

(2005) 6 SCC, 725., Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. And Another Vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Employees Union.

Facts:

Appeal was filed by the Company challenging the judgement of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by which the writ petition was allowed challenging the withdrawal of construction allowances to the workmen. The employer raised objection that the writ petition could not have been entertained, since remedy of the workmen was to raise an industrial dispute.

Following was said in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgement:

8.         “In U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh [(2004) 4 SCC 268: 2004 SCC (L & S) 637] it was held that when the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute, the High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. The person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided under the statute. To same effect are the decisions in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496: 1976 SCC (L & S) 70], Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [(1995) 5 SCC 75: 1995 SCC ( L & S) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110], Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corpn. of Ahmedabad [(2002) 2 SCC 542: 2002 SCC (L & S) 317 and in Scooters India v. Vijai E.V. Eldred [(1998) 6 SCC 549: 1998 SCC (L & S) 1611].

9.         In Rajasthan SRTC case [(1995) 5 SCC 75: 1995 SCC ( L & S) 1207: (1995) 31 ATC 110] it was observed as follows:

“[A] speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amendable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them.”

(2005) 8 SCC 264., U.P. State Spinning Company Ltd. Vs. R.S. Pandey and Another.

Facts:

A workmen filed a writ petition challenging the termination order. The writ petition was allowed on the ground that services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice. Before the Apex Court the Company submitted that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition when there being alternate remedy available.

Following was laid down in paragraphs 16,17, and 20 of the said judgement:

16.       “If, as was noted in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana [(1985) 3 SCC 267: AIR 1985 SC 1147] the appeal is from “Caesar to Caesar’s wife” the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility. In the instant case the writ petitioners had indicated the reasons as to why they thought that the alternative remedy would not be efficacious. Though the High Court did not go into that plea relating to bias in detail, yet it felt that alternative remedy would not be a bar to entertain the writ petition. Since the High Court has elaborately dealt with the question as to why the statutory remedy available was not efficacious, it would not be proper for this Court to consider the question again. When the High Court had entertained a writ petition notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy this Court while dealing with the matter in an appeal should not permit the question to be raised unless the High Court’s reasoning for entertaining the writ petition is found to be palpably unsound and irrational. Similar view was expressed by this Court in First ITO v. Short Bros. (P) Ltd. [(1966) 3 SCR 84: AIR 1967 SC 81] and State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. [(1977) 2 SCC 724: 1977 SCC (Tax) 335].That being the position, we do not consider the High Court’s judgment to be vulnerable on the ground that alternative remedy was not availed. /There are two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of statutory remedies. First is when the proceedings are taken before the forum under a provision of law which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground that they are incompetent without a party being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. Secondly, the doctrine has no application when the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We may add that where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law the High Court in an appropriate case can entertain a writ petition.

17.       Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies, unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.

20.       In a catena of decisions it has been held that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.”

Cases pertaining to election.

With regard to cases pertaining to election, the Apex Court has clearly laid down that when the remedy of challenging an election is provided in an enactment, the writ petition challenging an election of an office be not entertained.

In Harnek Singh Vs. Charanjit Singh and Others, (2005) 8 SCC 383.

Facts:

In the election for the post of Chairman, Panchayat Samiti the Returning Officer adjourned the poll and thereafter a date was fixed and election was completed. The High Court entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and set-aside the election.

Relevant paragraphs are 15, 16 and 18.

15.       “Prayers (b) and (c) aforementioned, evidently, could not have been granted in favoaur of the petitioner by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the High Court exercises a plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such jurisdiction being discretionary in nature may not be exercised inter alia keeping in view the fact that an efficacious alternative remedy is available therefore. (See Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 242: (2005) 7 Scale 290)

16.       Article 243-O of the Constitution mandates that all election disputes must be determined only by way of an election petition. This by itself may not per se bar judicial review which is the basic structure of the Constitution, but ordinarily such jurisdiction would not be exercised. There may be some cases where a writ petition would be entertained but in this case we are not concerned with the said question.

18.       Yet again in Jaspal Singh Arora [(1998) 9 SCC 594] this Court opined:

“3. These appeals must be allowed on a short ground. In view of the mode of challenging the election by an election petition being prescribed by the M.P. Municipalities Act, it is clear that the election could not be called in question except by an election petition as provided under that Act. The bar to interference by courts in electoral matters contained in Article 243-ZG of the Constitution was apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the writ petition. Apart from the bar under Article 243-ZG, on settled principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality was not called for because of the statutory provision for election petition and also the fact that an earlier writ petition for the same purpose by a defeated candidate had been dismissed by the High Court.”

Writ petition challenging Assessment Proceedings/Recovery of Tax.

The Apex Court in several cases has held that in assessment proceedings when there are specific statutory remedy available, High Court should not entertain the writ petition.

AIR 1983 SC, 603, Titagurh Paper Mills Co., Ltd., and Another Vs. State of Orissa and Another.

Facts:

The appellant had challenged two assessment orders of Assistant Sales Tax Officer in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Against which a S.L.P. was filed.

Relevant paragraphs are 4, 6 and 11

4.         “The only contention raised before the High Court was that the impugned orders of assessment being a nullity, the petitioners were entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but the High Court was not satisfied that this was a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The High Court while dismissing the writ petitions observed:

“Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and having gone through the records, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order(s) in exercise with our extraordinary jurisdiction since there is a right of appeal against the same. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order being a nullity is entitled to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction. We are not satisfied that this is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. There is no violation of principles of natural justice.”

6.         We are constrained to dismiss these petitions on the short ground that the petitioners have an equally efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed authority under sub-s. (1) of Section 23 of the Act, them a second appeal to the Tribunal under sub-s. (3)(a) thereof, and thereafter in the event the petitioners get no relief, to have the case stated to the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. In Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in Council; (1947) 74 Ind. App. 50: (AIR 1947 PC 78) Lord Uthwatt, J. in delivering the judgment of the Board observed that in the provenance of tax where the Act provided for a complete machinery which enabled an assessee to effectively raise in the courts the question of the validity of an assessment denied an alternative jurisdiction to the High Court to interfere. It is true that the decision of the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Company’s case, (supra) was in relation to a suit brought for a declaration that an assessment made by the Income-tax Officer was a nullity, and it was held by the Privy Council that an assessment made under the machinery provided by the Act, even if based on a provision subsequently held to be ultra vires, was not a nullity like an order of a court lacking jurisdiction and that S. 67 of the Income-tax, 1922 operated as a bar to the maintainability of such a suit. In dealing with the question whether S. 67 operated as a bar to a suit to set aside or modify an assessment made under a provision of the Act which is ultra vires, the Privy Council observed:

“In construing the section it is pertinent in their Lordships opinion to ascertain whether the Act contains machinery which enables an assessee effectively to raise in the courts the question whether a particular provision of the Income-tax Act bearing on the assessment made is or is not ultra vires. The presence of such machinery, though by no means conclusive, marches with a construction of the section which denies an alternative jurisdiction to inquire into the same subject-matter.”

11.       Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate redress against the wrongful acts complained of. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the prescribed authority under sub-s. (1) of S. 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-s. (3) of S. 23 of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under S. 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognized that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford; (1859) 6 CBNS 336 at p. 356 in the following passage:

“There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * the remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to”

The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.; 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co.; 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.; AIR 1940 PC 105. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.”

AIR 1985 SC 330., Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal Vs. Dunlop India Ltd and Others.

Facts:

Central Excise Department filed a S.L.P. challenging an interim order granted by the Calcutta High Court challenging the proceedings under Central Excise.

The Apex Court in the said judgement also deprecated the practice of granting interim order by the Calcutta High Court on an oral application. The Apex Court further held that in such matters whether the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Relevant paragraphs 3 and 4:

3.         “In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (AIR 1983 SC 603) A.P. Sen, E.S. Venkataramiah and R.B. Misra, JJ, held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Curt, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Art. 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art. 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.

4.         In Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. (AIR 1984 SC 1264), we had occasion to consider an interim order passed by the Calcutta High Court in regard to a matter no part of the cause of action relating to which appeared to arise within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. In that case the interim order practically granted the very prayers in the writ petition. We were forced to observe:

“It is obvious that the interim order is of a drastic character with a great potential for mischief. The principal prayer in the writ petition is the challenge to the order made or proposed to be made under Cl. 8-B of the Import Control Orders. The interim order in terms of prayers (j) and (k) has the effect of practically allowing the writ petition as the stage of admission without hearing the opposite parties. While we do not wish to say that a drastic interim order may never be passed without hearing the opposite parties even if the circumstances justify it, we are very firmly of the opinion that a statutory order such as the one made in the present case under Cl. 8-B of the Import Control Order ought not to have been stayed without at least hearing those that made the order. Such a stay may lead to devastating consequences leaving no way of undoing the mischief. Where a plentitude of power is given under a statute, designed to meet a dire situation, it is no answer to say that the very nature of the power and the consequences which may ensure is itself a sufficient justification for the grant of a stay of that order, unless,  of course, there are sufficient circumstances to justify a strong prima facie inference that the order was made in abuse of the power conferred by the statute. A statutory order such as the one under Cl. 8-B purports to be made in the public interest and unless there are even stronger grounds of public interest an ex parte interim order will not be justified. The only appropriate order to make in such cases is to issue notice to the respondents and make it returnable within a short period. This should particularly be so where the offices of the principal respondents and relevant records lie outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. To grant interim relief straightway and leave it to the respondents to move the court to vacate the interim order may jeopardize the public interest. It is notorious how if an interim order is once made by a court, parties employ every device and tactic to ward off the final hearing of the application. It is, therefore, necessary for the courts to be circumspect in the matter of granting interim relief, more particularly so where the interim relief is directed against orders or actions of public officials acting in discharge of their public duty and in exercise of statutory powers. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no interim relief should have been granted by the High Court in the terms in which it was done.” ”

(2002) 5 SCC 521., Secretary Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. And Others Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya and Others.

Facts:

In this case the Apex Court held that even if the U.P. Public Services Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass an interim order that cannot be a ground for bypassing the alternate remedy.

Relevant paragraphs 11 and 12:

11.       “These appeals are preferred against the order made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. WP No. 47130 of 2000 etc. on 1.2.2001. A Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad by the impugned judgment has held that the petitioner in the said writ petitions has an alternate remedy  by way of petitions before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal (the Tribunal), and had permitted the writ petitioner therein to approach the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to entertain any such petition to be filed by the writ petitioner without raising any objection as to limitation. There was a further direction to the Tribunal to decide the matter expeditiously.

12.       Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the remedy before the Tribunal under the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) Act is wholly illusory inasmuch as the Tribunal has no power to grant an interim order. Therefore, he contends that the High Court ought not to have relegated the petitioner to a fresh proceeding before the said Tribunal. We do not agree with these arguments of the learned counsel. When the statute has provided for the constitution of a Tribunal for adjudicating the disputes of a government servant, the fact that the Tribunal has no authority to grant an interim order is no ground to bypass the said Tribunal. In an appropriate case after entertaining the petitions by an aggrieved party if the Tribunal declines an interim order on the ground that it has no such power then it is possible that such aggrieved party can seek remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution but that is no ground to bypass the said Tribunal in the first instance itself. Having perused the impugned order, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the said order and the High Court was justified in directing the petitioner to approach the Tribunal. In the said view of the matter, the appeals are dismissed. No costs.”

(1981) 4 SCC., 247, V. Vellaswamy Vs. Inspector General of  Police, Tamil Nadu, Madras and Another.

Facts:

In this case the Apex Court held that even though there is a power of review under a statutory enactment that cannot be a ground for not entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Now, before closing the discussion on this subject, it will be useful to recollect again the exceptions to the principles of not entertaining the writ petition when alternate remedy is available.

The Apex Court in (1998) (8) SCC 1., Whirlpoorl Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, considered the said aspect and reiterated the principles and also noticed the exception to the rule.

Relevant paragraphs are 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21:

15.       “Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic  whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.

16.       Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana [AIR 1950 SC 163: 1950 SCR 566] laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207: (1954) 25 ITR 167]  which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, “unless there are good grounds therefore”, which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances

17.       A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86: 1958 SCR 595] as under:

“But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.”

18.       This proposition was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [AIR 1961 SC 1506: (1962) 1 SCR 753] and was affirmed and followed in the following words:

“The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court.”

19.       Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies Distt. [AIR 1961 SC 372: (1961) 41 ITR 191] laid down:

Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under Section 34, Income Tax Act.”

20.       Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation.

21.       That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the “Tribunal”.